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Since the law on health and safety was voted on the 1st July 1998, the 
role of the Institut de Veille Sanitaire (InVS)1 has been to detect “any event 
which changes or might change the population’s state of health” and to alert 
public authorities with the help of various health organisations, such as the 
Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments (AFSSA)2.  This 
requirement for a monitoring and alarm system came into being after the 
many public crises that marked the 1990s, and has become new common 
administrative and legal ground, some of the consequences of which we we 
will be examining here, by taking up the question of alarm raisers.  We have 
been able to show how the configuration that we have labelled “vigilance 
policy” came into being, following on from a series of affairs and alerts in 
fields as far ranging as technology, the environment, human health, 
agriculture and food (Chateauraynaud & Torny, 1999b).  Over recent years, 
what has above all been forced upon the actors involved is a deconfining of 
fields which had previously remained relatively closed and isolated:  health 
and safety warnings now concern technological sectors (such as nuclear 
energy), environmental controversies increasingly relate to human health 
(legionnaire’s disease, dioxin), agricultural debates examine questions of 
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risk (BSE, GMO), previously “political” dangers are re-examined in terms 
of risk (bioterrorism).  The category of health and safety3, created in the 
1990s, has proven to be transversal, allowing multiple actors to group 
together and share topics and types of intervention that had previously been 
rooted in specific and distinct areas of activity.  This general deconfining 
has created the conditions under which different approaches to risk can 
meet, thus giving substance to the notion that we now live in a “risk society” 
(Beck, 2001).  
 
1. What place to accord alarms? 
 
The change of configuration underlying the new health standards has led 
us to examine the place accorded to people or groups who raise or sound the 
alarm.  Nowadays institutional relays are more numerous, and alarm raisers 
have greater public legitimacy – something which was previously very 
much lacking.  In other words, the “alert” form has now reached a degree of 
public extension and evidence that everyone must accept, to the extent that 
in France we can now envisage whistleblower rights4.  Whilst detection and 
alarms are matters for specialist organisations, equipped with tools for 
monitoring and for ensuring traceability, what is it that leads people or 
groups to set off an alarm?  What is it that pushes people who are facing a 
danger towards the power of action?  To raise the alarm is above all to 
demonstrate that one can no longer control a source of risk, that it is 
impossible to reduce a danger.  When they raise the alarm, actors are not so 
much putting forms of justification to the test, as the capacity for action they 
accord others, especially the agencies specifically authorised to protect 
public welfare or interest5.  
 
Alarms alert the authorities deemed able to affect the future, but they also 
create constraints that vary in accordance with the devices within which 
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 It should nevertheless be noted that since the colloquium organised by the Sciences 
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 The most complicated situation is that of alarm raisers within a company, a professional 
milieu or an institution; when they speak out, they create tension between three types of 
interest:  that of the person or group sounding the alarm, that of the entity employing said 
person or group (or responsible for their activities) and, finally, that of the general public, 
be it in the form of public health, protection of the environment or overall safety (Bernstein 
& Jasper, 1996). 
they are tested, i.e. in which they are taken into consideration, qualified, 
discussed or managed.  In order for an alarm (or a criticism or a protest) to 
exist, the outside world must be “listening”.  This might be characterised by 
keen use of one’s perceptual faculties, aided where necessary by instruments 
and metrology, and by an effort to remember, enabling one to list a series of 
events, of precursory signs, the potentialities of which relate to public 
interest and wellbeing.  Taken as constant participation as events unfold6, 
such vigilance is essential, and also involves redefining ??ouvertures 
d’avenir, without which there is no longer any real reason to act, because 
the weight of the past is such that all efforts are pointless and that it is 
already too late7.  The most “trodden” example of an alert moving over to 
the public arena is that of the development of a debate or a controversy.  
The examination of numerous cases shows that one can defend the notion 
that the majority of alerts announced by official spokespersons or journalists 
mainly relate to how the alert is managed rather than to the emrging 
dangers.  
 
Attention to the cognitive and political operations that actors use to 
sound their alarms in the public arena shows that mobilisation depends not 
only on the way in which routines, milieux and material and institutional 
devices are affected by the alarms, but also on the injustices involthe 
construction of victim groups nowadays being decisive for the progression 
of health and safety cases.  This is one of the main avenues of case 
progression:  by making the damage (real or potential) tangible for other 
actors, alarm carriers manage to deconfine their cause, which has an effect 
on the authorities (Dobry, 1992).  For example, apiarists who mobilise well 
beyond their own sphere, by demonstrating that the fate of bees affects both 
the environment and public health; a consumer association which reveals 
that a dangerous product is being sold; an engineer who becomes an alarm 
raiser and declares the safety systems on a food chain or in a knacker’s yard 
to be faulty.  These operations have unequal chances of success, the 
constrainyts of which can be seen from the indicators provided by the actors 
themselves, i.e. via the arguments and tools that they develop through their 
actions and stances.  When the deconfining of alarms succeeds, it has the 
effect of increasing the concern of far-removed actors, which in turn creates 
the conditions for a “media explosion” and for appearing on “political 
agendas”, to use popular “crisis management” terms.  The duration of the 
process is a crucial variable to take into account.  For example, in the case 
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of the “Chernobyl cloud” it took almost 15 years to organise a proper review 
of how the health consequences in France were managed, requiring in-depth 
analyses of contaminations of the food chain (milk, grasses, mushrooms, 
fruits).  Some cases are marked by what we refer to as the silent period:  a 
silent period is when there is a huge gap between what is being done by 
actors in the field, and how this is reported in the media and in political 
arenas (asbestos serving here as a paradigm). 
 
The problem of alarms allows us to examine risks by changing the 
questions which are usually asked and which all too often revolve around 
the tension between “real risk” and “perceived risk”.  It means examining 
cases on the basis of questions such as:  what is a pertinent alarm for a given 
sector of activity?  Who raises it?  Who is it aimed at?  What entities are 
involved?  What points of purchase does it provide to aid assessment?  How 
much time does it leave to act?  On a more theoretical level, one might 
wonder what the global political configuration produces, dominated over 
recent years by the principle of precaution, in terms of concrete activity, in 
laboratories, companies, associations and organisations.  How can one cope 
with the complexity of the processes, the diverse milieux, devices and 
representations?  Actors have to directly face the tension between period of 
waiting and emergency, advance declaration  and period of observation, 
period of verification and crosschecking, period for public debate and 
decision-making.  One of the challenges of sociology is to provide tools 
with which to describe moments when situations change and the 
reconfigurations through which the nature and scope of alarms and risks are 
redefined.  
 
 
2. Critical configurations and the political processing of 
bad signs  
 
Most alerts take shape through long processes which combine acts of 
continuous vigilance with the exploration of unexpected characteristics, 
mobilising heterogeneous capacities for expertise.  This is why one can 
never fully rationalise an alert process using remote standards and 
calculations.  It is only after the fact that one can project events into a 
calculation space.  Indeed, risk management involves creating a common 
calculation space.  This can be clearly seen in the normative activity of 
national or international authorities  which focus conflicts and negotiations 
onon the elements to be taken into account in the calculations.  How can a 
series of experiences generate a new calculation space?8  The relation 
between experiences and calculations was upset by the increasing number of 
health crises, the treatment for which had changed since the outbreak of the 
AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s and, in France, since the blood 
transfusion scandals (Hermitte, 1996).  At both local and international 
levels, it is no longer possible to say, without exposing oneself to criticism, 
that “according to the calculations, the risk is negligible”.  Every case and 
every uncertainty must be examined, and numerous spokespersons must be 
must be listened to (Callon et al., 2001).  It is in this sense that the principle 
of precaution, which now serves as a framework for all protagonists, can be 
considered to be an imperative, even where there is a temporary absence of 
tangible scientific facts.  
 
The emergence of new devices (health agencies, traceability tools, 
collective expertise procedures) goes hand-in-hand with a considerable 
volume of literature on the principle of precaution, seen as the new 
“standard for decision-making” or “principle of action” by some, and as a 
“rhetoric formula” or “political umbrella” by others – its inscription into the 
French constitution via the Charte de l’Environement9 led to lively debate, 
even within the parliamentary majority.  How can such a level of reasoning 
and representation correspond to the practical constraints of the actors, to 
the heterogeneousness of their milieux and to the modifications thay make 
there – sometimes silently – and which, in order to be revealed and taken 
into consideration, require the involvement of people or groups who are able 
to convince and mobilise the relevant authorities?  Everything depends on 
the points of purchase that the phenomena offer (or not) to attention and 
opinion within the regular frequent contact of milieux.  One cannot have 
“abstract” actors, without milieux, without involvement in the world.  Every 
person, every group, every organisation develops forms of vigilance related 
to their activities.  The vigilance of a veterinary surgeon will not be the 
same as that of a qaility manager in the food industry, or of militant in an 
association, or of an inspector from the DGCCRF10 or the World Health 
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 La Direction Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la Répression des 
Fraudes = department of the French ministry of economy and finance, dealing with 
competition, consumers and fraud. 
Organisation11.  But all of these activities require a common basis, a vital 
level of presence, intertwined with common sense that is not a stock of 
static or intangible representations (Fischler, 2000), but which is constantly 
changing.  From common sense to the most formal expertise, vigilance 
allows people to adjust the points of purchase made necessary by changes in 
devices and milieux, and to realise relatively quickly when they are losing 
grip on an phenomenon.  
 
As a reminder, there are two main models for dealing with collective 
risks.  The first considers that societies such as ours have the ability to 
regulate and learn, and that it is always possible to reduce or eradicate 
dangers even if this means going through serious crises and a series of 
painful catastrophes; it is a question of time and resources, of rationally 
organising power and knowledge.  This model takes the form of a generous 
positivism put into context, i.e. an evolutionism which admits that there are 
be obstacles and trials, but having confidence that human collectives will 
overcome them as long as they remain scientifically and technically rational.  
In this model, the alert is absorbed in risk management devices, and the 
ways in which it emerges is more often than not anecdotal.  What is 
important is the tools used to identify and predict the risks, and these tools 
can only get better.  This paradigm of risk supposes a sociology based on a 
model of actor alignment – of the type that was built up (at great cost) 
around the AIDS epidemic12.  
 
The second model takes an opposite stance, which is that there is no 
linear process that has simply been derailed by unexpected catastrophes, and 
that it is in fact a question of permanent change:  when one has only just 
begun to resolve a problem, another difficulty or source of uncertainty 
arises, forcing one to change strategy and solutions, and, in so doing, to drop 
all ongoing work and/or to constantly revise one’s priorities.  With this 
model, researchers, decision-makers and members of the public are obliged 
to continually divert their attention and thus expose themselves to the tragic 
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doom” when in January 2004 he declared that bird flu’ had “the potential to kill millions of 
people if its most deadly strain were to combine with a human flu’ that was moving 
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 When one looks more closely things are far more complicated; one finds that 
heterogeneous players have contributed towards the development of measures, and that 
there were numerous controversies.  See (Dodier, 2003). 
consequences of situations that had supposedly been resolved.  It is the latter 
hypothesis which underlies the notion that we have moved from a mindset 
of risk management using centralised calculation spaces, to one of vigilance 
and alarm that works by the one-off movement and mobilisation of actors 
and resources.  
 
Even if there have been major changes within organisations, it cannot be 
said that the second hypothesis has definitively pushed out the first:  it is 
more a question of a reconfiguration of the way in which tasks are shared 
between these two interpretations of “risk society”.  Whilst everyone is 
focusing on cases such as GMOs and global warming, it was already-known 
cases of risk that literally exploded in September 2001:  a terrorist attack 
and a major chemical accident, which led many actors to revive 
longstanding questions.  Similarly, the floods of September 2002 show that 
old regional planning problems have still not been resolved.  Erika’s oil 
slick had only just dropped out of the headlines, when the sinking of 
Prestige occurred to remind us that nothing had been solved with regard to 
sea transport.   
 
We therefore have to give up on the idea that one given case is more 
important or more complex or more interesting than another (be it politically 
or intellectually), and give ourselves the resources and tools with which to 
build (working together as much as possible) a space for alerts and crises.  
The “novelty” of a given alarm is not a good criterion, and all types of 
announcement of a danger or catastrophe must receive the same level of 
attention, without there being any pre-determined risk scale13.  There are 
three constraints for actors, be they experts, decision-makers, researchers, 
industrialists or members of the general public:  the proliferation of sources 
and statements; the feeling that categories of analysis and decision-making 
responsibilities being constantly called into question due to new cases 
arriving and creating a permanent state of emergency; the difficulty of the 
overall appreciation and assessment of cases via the relationships between 
past series, the current configuration and future potentialities.  Whether we 
are talking about work conditions, industrial wastelands, food safety, new 
viruses or scientific and technological challenges14, most of the alerts that 
become crises suffer not only from occupation of the political-media space, 
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 On the scientific and technological aspects relating to sport, see (Duret & Trabal, 2001). 
but also from scientific expertise, from other cases deemed to have priority 
and focusing attention on privileged sectors.  Entry through the generation 
of alerts creates the conditions for a third avenue which falls between the 
two models mentioned above.  It allows one to avoid agenda setting theories 
and free commentary on the “new fears” and “uncertainties” of the 
contemporary world  
 
3. Alarm time and mobilisation time:  two models 
 
Let us begin this chapter with a reminder of the main results from our 
research on alerts.  Analysis of the mobilisation and public decision-making 
processes in a wide range of domains reveals that three major parameters 
govern how an alert is handled:  the degree to which the “catastrophe” can 
be predicted, the degree of intentionality implied by the real or possible 
damage, and the degree of reversibility attributed to the phenomena in 
question.  
 
Regarding the first parameter, the degree of predictability, we have the 
contrast between catastrophes that take everyone by surprise (Mont Blanc 
Tunnel, Concorde crash, dioxin in Belgian chicken, AZF15) and the series of 
signs that gradually lead to a case file (asbestos, mad cow disease, thyroids, 
glycol ethers).  With the former, the protagonists are immediately faced with 
an investigation and a search for responsibility.  But the event serves as a 
precedent and leads to numerous corrective or regulatory actions – as with 
debates on the application of the Soveso directive after the Toulouse 
explosion.  With the latter, the protagonists are faced with the question of 
subsequent extensions and new developments:  how much time do they have 
to act and to come to a definitive decision?  At the centre of the continuum 
we find devices that allow us to predict a catastrophe, or else to predict 
serious problems in the future (near or far).  
 
The second parameter, the degree of intentionality, ranges from terrorism 
and industrial sabotage to the unleashing of natural forces such as the 
December 1999 storms.  The most complicated and common situations are 
those which are located in the centre:  there are voluntary acts, projects, 
intentions, strategies, but no intent to cause damage or harm people.  In this 
type of case, radical criticism tends to blame everything on the intentional 
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 Explosion at the AZF chemical plant in Toulouse, France, le 21 septembre 2001. Ten 
days after the September, 11th attack, the purposivity of the explosion has immediately 
been discussed and remained as a official hypothesis for a long time. 
part.  The problem here is deciding who is responsible:  who does the act, 
who claims responsibility for it?  Under France’s new criminal law, the 
notion of endangering the life of a third party allows responsibility to be 
imputed without having to consider actual damage, even though the law on 
unintentional acts considerably limts the scope of this.  
 
The third parameter, the degree of reversibility, relates to the effect of the 
actions to be carried out:  is it possible to turn back, isn’t it too late to act, 
can we avoid disastrous consequences (mad cow’s disease, global 
warming)?  It allows us to distinguish between cases that are difficult to 
reverse, such as asbestos, where the fibres have been affecting victims’ 
lungs for a long time, and other cases where action can substantially limit 
the damaging effects – such as toxic food infections and the now famous 
recall of products based upon increasingly extensive traceability (Torny, 
1998). 
 
At each stage of the process, at each moment of the test, these three 
fundamental parameters are explicitly examined by the actors involved.  In 
other words they are at the very heart of the processes of monitoring, 
sounding the alarm, debating, accusing and standardising.   Other gradients 
still affect the transformation of alerts or complaints, opinions or decisions:  
the degree of tangibility (degree of presence in the sensitive world), the 
extent (from local to global), the degree of publicity (degree of presence in 
the public space or the extent to which the matter has received political or 
media coverage).  Numerous works over recent years have shown that when 
alarm raisers do not succeed in overcoming this combination of inseparably 
cognitive and political constraints, they more often than not opt for a form 
of radical criticism.  This being the case, alerts can be carried by social 
movements or critical groups as exemplary themes or as stakes for 
mobilisation. 
 
From these results we can draw up two main models which give us a 
better understanding of how alarm raisers contribute towards changing 
cases.  Although the first is developed from the example of asbestos, it 
continues to reoccur whenever there is a major time-lag between the first 
alerts and the standardisation process that constitutes the end of the crisis – 
in the same way as the WHO declares an epidemic to be over.  
 
The first model is marked by a considerable time-lag between the first 
alerts and controversies, and the the time at which the matter is taken into 
hand.  This creates gaps between risk measurements (scientific 
measurements but also administrative measures) and general mobilisation, 
represented here in bold (Figure 1).  The repetition of alerts is necessary in 
order for public authorities to take charge of the case for its duration.  In this 
type of case, litigation, debates and public protests are difficult to avoid, 
with the degree of reversibility diminishing even as the imputation 
mechanisms are falling into place.  This being the case, the alarm raiser 
easily becomes an exposer. 
 
Figure 1 :  Deferred alert management 
 
 
In the second model, being based upon institutional devices (Figure 2), 
early alert management makes risk mobilisations and measures compatible.  
Despite this, with the help of communication consultants we continue to talk 
about “crises”, even though compared to the previous example it is no 
longer a question of simply publicly taking the dangers and risks into 
consideration.  The extent to which the phenomenon is reversible is often 
large, without it being possible to predict, even approximately, its future 
extension16.  Demobilisation might occur if a phenomenon rapidly 
disappears, or fails to manifest itself; this demonstrates the need for 
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 This does not prevent players from developing tools (such as epidemiological modelling) 
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suggested a result of between 63 and … 136,000 victims in Great Britain!  The gap was so 
huge that certain French newspapers told their readers that the expected number of victims 
was between 63,000 and 136,000 victims.  On the effect of these predictions on how BSE is 
structured as a European public problem, see (Barbier, 2003) 
vigilance with regard to administrative and political acts.  Alerts then take 
on another meaning, because in this configuration they tend to relate to 
management procedures rather than to the events themselves, i.e. they 
constitute themselves in the shape of spin-off alerts.  The alarm raiser 
becomes an alarm carrier, in as much as he remains with the alarms and the 
risks beyond the initial mobilising phases.  
 
Figure 2 :  Rapid alert management 
 
It must not be thought that these too models belong to any given era – an 
“old” model dating back to the 1980s and a “new” model that has now taken 
its place.  They constitute two different forms at the two extremes of alert 
management, the first being subject to the criticism of “it is already too 
late”, whilst the second – as in the case of the Coca-Cola affair – raises the 
question of the precocity or the too rapid extension of public authorities or 
of extreme media coverage (Besançon et al., 2004). 
 
Between these two models, defining “the right moment to act” is vital, 
but it is less a case of being reactive in all situations17 than of having the 
ability to manage and/or investigate cases and to maintain collective 
vigilance (Chateauraynaud, 1999) even when media and public interest has 
moved on to something else.  From the public decision-makers’ point of 
view, alert management, exposure of dangers and other claims do not in 
themselves resolve the question of case priorities and resource allocation 
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 Following the heatwave crisis, the French health department (Direction Générale de la 
Santé) reorganised its alert unit in order for it to operate 24/7. 
(Chateauraynaud & Torny, 1999a).  Generalised recourse to new forms of 
expertise and public debates do not simplify the decision-making process, 
and we are seeing more and more case files which have already been 
deconfined and publicly discussed bounce back into the limelight after it has 
been demonstrated that reparatory measures have not been completed – two 
examples would be sites containing asbestos and sources of legionnaire’s 
disease.  
 
Conclusion :  how can alarms be raised at international 
level? 
 
The question of prioritising concerns has taken over from that of the 
silence or forgetfulness that characterised the previous era, giving up all its 
space to alarm carriers.  New forms of “general public presence”, of 
activism and “alternative” mobilisations occupy the public arena and modify 
the conditions for dealing with alerts and conflicts.  The list of mediations is 
thus getting longer:  new protest movements, new forms of public debate 
(citizens conference  or social forums), the Internet and the ‘information 
society” all combine to create a political configuration marked by a 
tendency to exaggerate matters within so-called “crisis communication”.  
These changes involve new forms of speaking out and public debate, and 
the development of norms for action and opinion (collective expertise, 
traceability, principle of precaution, sustainable development, etc.).  In 
return, they produce tangible modifications to the way in which public 
problems emerge and last, and consequently affect the processes of public 
decision-making.  
 
The study of alert processes and how they are managed means we have to 
go beyond the framework of France.  On the one hand we are seeing an 
increase in the sources of alert and risk, uncertainty and conflict, of which 
emerging diseases  (Ebola, SARS, bird flu) are prototypes within the field of 
health.  These phenomena again raise the question of international 
cooperation and of the confidence given to each country as a power of 
action capable of containing threats; they redefine the scope of national 
sovereignties within a traditionally regal domain18.  On the other hand, then 
end of the 20th century was marked by the emergence of new critical figures 
in which the notion of alert is increasingly mobilised.  Now banal under the 
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 As an example, take the case of the Starlink GMO corn debacle, which led American 
authorities to allow Japanese inspectors onto their corn production and storage sites.  See 
(Torny, 2003) 
labels of “anti-globalisation”, “alter-mondialism” or “criticism of 
globalisation” they have become obligatory for numerous cases.  With this 
internationalisation of affairs it is more a question of the continuous 
invention of protest and overflow techniques19 than any renewal of rhetoric 
in the critique of global capitalism20.  Alarm carriers who become involved 
on such a scale of action and mobilisation need too be especially well 
equipped.  The question of alerts here joins the notion of the emergence of 
mobilisation spaces on an international scale, and of how authorities exist 
(those which give body to what is referred to as the “international 
community”).  
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 Listing these types of action, which range from pulling up transgenic plants to computer 
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 Certain authors have become masters in the art of seeing in every crisis the prodromes of 
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